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1. This paper aims to provide a view of the relationship between political and legal thought, 
in order to discuss some topics and philological aspects of the research on Guicciardini’s 
work that I’m conducting here at the Italian Academy1. 
To show you simply a single perspective in which we can discuss the relationship 
between law and politics at the beginning of the XVIth Century I will be focussing on the well 
known dialogue between Guicciardini and his friend Niccolò Machiavelli and emphasising 
some peculiar aspects of how they interpret the «imitation of the ancients», as the attempt to 
base politics upon its own principles, iuxta propria principia2. To this end, no page is more 
appropriate than Machiavelli’s Preface to Discourses on Livy in illustrating and clarifying the 
way in which the Italian Renaissance considered the rediscovery of the ancient classical texts, 
as a set of examples useful to contemporary rulers3: 
  
Considering how much honour is attributed to antiquity, and how many times (leaving aside many 
other examples) someone has purchased a fragment of an ancient statue at a great price to have it near 
him, to decorate his home, and to have it imitated by those who delight in that art, and how those 
artists with every diligence then strive in all their works to represent it, and, on the other hand, seeing 
that the most virtuous enterprises the histories show us to have been carried out in ancient kingdoms 
and republics by kings, generals, citizens, lawgivers, and others who have laboured for their native 
lands are praised with astonishment rather than imitated (indeed, are avoided by everyone in every 
way, to the extent that no trace of that ancient ability has survived), I cannot be but both amazed and 
saddened. And I am even more so when I see that in the civil disputes that arise among citizens, or in 
the illnesses that afflict men, we always have recourse to those remedies or those judgements that 
have been pronounced or prescribed by the ancients, since civil laws are nothing other than the 
decisions delivered by the jurists of antiquity which, organized into a body, teach our contemporary 
jurists how to render judgements (italics mine), nor again is medicine anything other than the 
experiments performed by the doctors of antiquity upon which today’s doctors and their diagnoses 
rely. Nevertheless, in organizing republics, maintaining states, governing kingdoms, in instituting a 
militia and administering a war, in executing legal decisions among subjects, and in expanding an 
empire, no prince, republic, military leader, or citizen can be found who has recourse to the examples 
of the ancients.  
 
 This arises «from not possessing a true understanding of the histories, so people who 
read take pleasure in hearing about the variety of accidents they contain without otherwise 
thinking about imitating them, since they believe that such imitation is not only difficult but 
impossible, as if the sky, the sun, the elements, or human beings had changed in their motion, 
order, and power from what they were in antiquity»4. 
 It has been said that these words remind us of the dedication to Brunelleschi, written 
by Leon Battista Alberti in his De pictura, even if Machiavelli could not possibly have read 
the albertian manuscript (the work was, in fact, printed for the first time in the middle of 
XIXth Century)5. But this does not really matter to us right now. As Federico Chabod wrote in 
his Lessons of Historical Method, perhaps exaggerating a little: «Find every source of 
Machiavelli, and you still haven’t found anything of his political thought»6. This remark was 




Machiavelli, which Chabod considered as a «creator» of the modern political thought, a man 
«in search for unknown lands and seas» of whom we know less or nothing about his 
formative years. Nonetheless, if Machiavelli has been a creator of something new, an 
«inventore», to use the words of Guicciardini, it’s important to appreciate how, and what he 
was doing writing the Preface of the Discorsi. 
 With explicit reference to the relationship between law and medicine, in Machiavelli’s 
Preface we hear an echo of humanistic disputes, which were studied in detail by Lynn 
Thorndike and Eugenio Garin7. In these controversies de nobilitate legum et medicinae, on 
the nobility of law and medicine, were involved, among others, Leonardo Bruni, Poggio 
Bracciolini, Nicoletto Vernia, Coluccio Salutati, Marsilio Ficino, Matteo Palmieri and some 
traces can still be found in Girolamo Savonarola’s sermons and treatises8. These disputes 
were the expression of a profound cultural crisis, which manifested itself in searching for new 
relationships between the different branches of knowledge, new balances and new methods9. 
And Machiavelli was, in fact, more interested in considering the method of the two sciences, 
medicine and law, which, according to him, was essentially based on the imitation of the 
ancient physicians and lawyers10. He thought that modern lawyers and physicians were 
trained in that way. In other words, those sciences could count on the authority of a tradition. 
When Machiavelli says that «civil laws are nothing other than the decisions («sentenze») 
delivered by the jurists of antiquity which, organized into a body («ridutte in ordine»), teach 
our contemporary jurists how to render judgements», he, probably, has in mind the Digest11, 
the body of Roman law collected by the Emperor Justinian, in VIth Century, and even the 
long tradition of legal studies conducted upon it. 
 As we know, the oldest manuscript of the Justinian’s Digest, the so-called littera 
pisana or littera florentina, was brought to Florence with the conquest of Pisa in 1406, and 
was guarded and treated as an object of worship12. It was rarely exposed in public, and when 
it was, only by candlelight. On that very manuscript, Angelo Poliziano, in Florence, had 
started a work of historization of the Roman law, utilising a new philological method, which 
would lead to completion the need for a study of law in a humanistic key13. It is interesting to 
note that Machiavelli’s father, Bernardo, who was a very modest lawyer, was chosen by the 
humanist Chancellor of Florence, Bartolomeo Scala, as an interlocutor in the dialogue De 
legibus et iudiciis (1483). It was Bernardo Machiavelli who introduced in the dialogue the 
issue of the litera florentina, «the authority of the Pandects, which are religiously kept with 
other public documents in the Palazzo Vecchio»14.   
 This «humanistic» renaissance of law was actually the second revival or 
«renaissance» of Roman law15. In a perspective of legal history we have to talk about a 
«Renaissance» as early as the XIth Century, when, in Bologna, the Roman law became, for 
the very first time, an object of science. Glossators, first, and commentators, then, gave it new 
life: it was the birth of the common law. This period has been called the Legal Medieval 
Renaissance16. That second renaissance of Roman law, which rises between the XIVth and the 
XVth Century, starts out with the accusations made by Petrarch against lawyers17. «The 
greater part of our legists», Petrarch declares, «cares nothing for knowing about the origins of 
law and about the founders of jurisprudence, and has no other preoccupation than to gain as 
much as they can from their profession»18. The disjunction between «legal doctrines and 
practice» was not related to the «norms themselves, and certainly not to the Justinianic 
Corpus, but to those who interpreted the law»19. These accusations, that lawyers were 
unhistorical and had no interest in the arts and literature, which «would be of great practical 
use for their very profession», were repeated by humanists such as Lorenzo Valla20. They 
attacked the medieval jurists for lacking in linguistic, philological and historical expertise, 




 These ideas acted very deeply in the consciousness of the jurists, leading them, not to 
an open revolt against the medieval tradition, but to a conflict within themselves and the way 
they interpreted the law and played their role in society21. Leaving aside the surface polemic, 
these new positions however did not, in any way, intend to call into question the authority of 
medieval jurists22. Their authoritativeness, especially in politics, and not only in legal 
disputes, where it may seem obvious, remained intact throughout the XVIth century23.  
 A humanist such as Alciato, for example, still refers to Bartolo da Sassoferrato, the 
most distinguished jurist of the XIVth century, to signify «the law as a whole»24. Bartolo was 
the greatest figure in the late medieval school of law, and his authority was so great that his 
opinions were cited by rulers and by courts as if they had the authority of judicial decisions25. 
It is impossible to understand the Italian origins of what Hans Baron has called «Civic 
Humanism» without taking into account Bartolo’s anti-tyrannical roots as well as those of his 
followers, first and foremost Baldo degli Ubaldi,26. Similarly we cannot comprehend the 
roots of so-called «republicanism» without considering the political contours of their «civilis 
sapientia», as it has been pointed out by Nicolai Rubinstein, referring to Bartolo’s treatises 
De regimine civitatis and De tyranno27. Such writings were still considered of indisputable 
authority throughout the «machiavellian moment»28, as we shall see for Guicciardini’s 
political thought. This anti-tyrannical tradition of Bartolism, a typical element of Italian 
political thought, was acknowledged in the late Renaissance by Jean Bodin29, and the 
Calvinist jurist Innocent Gentillet, author of the Antimachiavel in 1576, which expressly 
referred to Bartolo, against the Italian courtiers’ bad reading and misleading interpretation of 
Machiavelli’s works, to remind them of the good and old tradition of Italian political 
thought30.  
 Bartolism may rightly be regarded as the key to legal and political modernity, despite 
the criticism of humanists31. Donald Kelley stated that «Bartolism has often been derided as a 
particularly virulent form of scholasticism, but from a less partisan standpoint it appears as a 
central and shaping feature of Renaissance culture, most especially in political terms. For 
Bartolus and Baldus displayed not only technical legal expertise in ‘both laws’ but also the 
values and aspirations of a new civilità, a new political culture based on a commitment to the 
ideals of citizenship and the active life»32. It is hard to believe that Machiavelli was detached 
from these events, because of a tradition of political thought, which was still alive in the 
Florentine Chancery33, as well as for his training, still unknown to us, but, as it was shown by 
Laurence Arthur Burd, he could not be devoid of some legal knowledge34. 
 So returning to the Preface, cited at the opening, and considering this in the context of 
Bartolism and anti-bartolism in which Machiavelli wrote, we can appreciate his Discourses 
as an attempt to manage in a commentary, a body of examples to be imitated and helpful in 
ruling the republics. A commentary, such as the legal ones, would have gained its own 
authority for its contemporaries. If the jurisconsults can be taught to judge according to a 
body of precedents, decisions («sentenze»), examples, derived from the history of their 
profession, why cannot rulers be taught to rule according to a body of examples taken from 
their history?35  
Law, according to him, is a discipline that represents a successful use of antiquity. In 
this connection, the lessons of history could be successful in politics (and this is the matter of 
contention between Machiavelli and humanists), only doing for politics what it had already 
done for the law, giving it new and perpetual life, a tradition, as it were, to classical antiquity. 
After the publication of Machiavelli’s Discourses, Livy would no longer be the same in 
political training, just as the Digest was no longer the same after a long tradition of glossators 
and commentators. 
 The dialogue with Francesco Guicciardini (if studied in the same way as John Najemy 




in appreciating just how a jurist, as his friend actually was, might consider the method 
presented at the beginning of the Discourses. 
 
 
2. Considering the problem more thoroughly, the dispute between Charles Benoist and 
Vincent Luciani, regarding the «influence» of Machiavellian political thought on 
Guicciardini, was resolved by Felix Gilbert37. We know that Guicciardini had known the 
Discourses since 1521, but we do not know anything about his knowledge of the Prince. 
Nevertheless, as Gilbert wrote, «in his very first work, the Storie Fiorentine, which was 
completed before Machiavelli had begun to write the Prince, Guicciardini already reveals the 
distinctive traits which persist through the whole of his life. As early as this, he stands out as 
the Florentine patrician exhibiting the benefits and limitations of an outlook determined by 
class, he displays the keen, legally trained mind to which the rich intellectual heritage of the 
15th century was only a useful instrument for practical ends, he shows himself possessed of an 
exclusive, passionate devotion to the world of history and politics (italics mine). His mind, in 
its essential features, is definitely formed. Yet, this is but the frame, and within it, his political 
thought shows change and development [...]. This development indicates that his thought 
must have been affected by outside factors»38. In seeking the causes of this development 
there is no reason to consider Machiavelli as a decisive factor, but we must not discard the 
possibility of Machiavelli’s influence. 
 The dialogue between the two friends discloses the different ways in which they 
interpreted the histories and lessons of the ancients. It may reveal the peculiar characters of a 
Machiavellian influence in defining the contours of the later method of Guicciardini. We 
know that Guicciardini thought himself, first of all, as a doctor of laws. Even Machiavelli in 
his letters refers to his friend as to the «iuris utriusque doctor» (doctor of both civil and canon 
laws), and with this title Guicciardini introduced himself in his Storia d’Italia. In book X, 
talking about his diplomatic mission in Spain (1511), he writes that in a «wavering and 
irresolute disposition, to the great displeasure of the King of France», the Florentines sent an 
«ambassador to the king of Aragon, Francesco Guicciardini, he who wrote this history, doctor 
of laws»39. This passage should be considered even in relation to the history of the European 
reception of the Storia d’Italia, after it was published for the first time in 1561. We have the 
impressive study Francesco Guicciardini and His European Reputation written at Columbia 
University by Vincent Luciani, in 1936. The work is a history of the editions and translations 
of Guicciardini’s work and provides an account of the reviews of it. We still do not know 
anything about the way how the political and legal thought used the Storia d’Italia. The work 
of Guicciardini was in fact a fundamental key for the modern definition of some important 
concepts, and it has been read even as a body of legal cases and of political terms. Jurists as 
Jean Bodin, Michel de Montaigne or Alberico Gentili, during the late XVIth Century read the 
Storia d’Italia in this way. This public of readers deserves our respect and legitimates the 
attempts to investigate the Storia as well as the other Guicciardini’s works even in a legal 
perspective. 
There is no need to dwell on Guicciardini’s legal training. In this respect, a lot has 
been said and recently Paul Grendler wrote about the Ricordanze, an autobiography in which 
Guicciardini introduces himself, as usual, as a «doctor in civil and canon law»40. He was the 
son of Piero Guicciardini, a humanist and republican, who belonged to the Florentine ruling 
class41. So he was born with a «grado» («rank»), a «status» which granted him an important 
role in the government of the city combined with a specific political responsibility42. Piero 
gave him the name of Francesco after Francesco di Filippo de’ Nerli, his father’s maternal 
grandfather, and Tommaso, in reverence of St. Thomas Aquinas on whose feast day he was 




platonic philosopher43. His father was a Savonarola’s devoted follower, so as he tells in 
another work, entitled, A se stesso (1513), he was «allevato santamente», probably amongst 
the Fanciulli of the Friar. He began to study law in Florence in 1498, at the Studio with 
Jacopo Modesti da Prato, a humble professor, but he immediately found Filippo Decio, a 
renowned canonist, who became his mentor. In fact, Guicciardini followed Decio, when he 
went to Padua, where he was the highest paid professor of law. As Guicciardini wrote in his 
Storia d’Italia, Decio was «the most excellent jurist of his time». There would be much to say 
about their relationship, because Guicciardini was very devoted to Decio. Guicciardini lived 
in his house in Padua for two years and attended his public legal disputes (with pro et contra 
about a particular legal issue) that his mentor would always win. As a result, many of 
Guicciardini’s subsequent political discourses contain pro et contra, revealing his legal 
background. The young student, actually, chose his mentor almost as suggested by Giovanni 
Battista Caccialupi in his De modo in iure studendi, a sort of a bestseller guide for young 
students of law: «Choose a teacher carefully, obey him, read the proper books, and learn the 
best methods of allegation and disputation; for this has always been the way to form a ‘new 
Justinian’»44. In 1505, still in Padua, he wrote a repertoire of canon laws, and in October, 
back in Florence, he began to read the Istituzioni at the Studio. He took his doctorate in 
November, giving his lecture, with a remarkable group of sponsors: Antonio Malegonnelle, 
Francesco Pepi and Giovan Vettorio Soderini, all of them lawyers and key men in politics 
who put their legal skills at the service of the State45.  The same year went on lecturing at the 
Studio and began to practise law with great reputation. 
The studies Osvaldo Cavallar devoted to Guicciardini’s legal practice provide a legal 
training deeply rooted in that bartolism discussed before46. What we have to do now is 
beginning an investigation on his works, considering properly his deep legal background, 
since this was never done before. We don’t have to reduce Guicciardini’s thought entirely to 
his legal training and skills, but reading his pages we have to keep in mind his conceptual 
toolbox, which could be useful to understand some of his topics that remain still obscure, 
even after a long tradition of studies dedicated to him.  
 
3. Starting from his legally trained mind, pointed out by Gilbert, we need to ask how he might 
consider the imitation of the examples taken from the ancient histories provided by his friend 
Machiavelli. We know he writes his Considerations on the Discourses of Machiavelli, as an 
attempt to restore dialogue and dispute with his friend lost in 152747. His Ricordi, a collection 
of regulae taken from his own experience, gives an account of the difficulties he saw related 
to the successful use of Machiavellian method in politics. In Ricordi C 110, he wrote48: 
 
How wrong it is to cite the Romans at every turn. For any comparison to be valid, it would be 
necessary to have a city with conditions like theirs, and then to govern it according to their example. 
In the case of a city with different qualities, the comparison is as much out of order as it would be to 
expect a jackass to race like a horse. 
 
 Guicciardini, referring to his friend Machiavelli, discourages the unconditional 
application of the examples as a wrong method. As the lawyer he was, he probably had in 
mind a Justinian’s maxim: «non exemplis sed legibus iudicandum est» (C. 7, 45, 13). It has to 
be judged not with examples, but with laws and rules. In his ricordo C 117, he wrote49: 
 
To judge by example is very misleading. Unless they are similar in every respect, examples are 
useless, since every tiny difference in the case may be a cause of great variations in the effects. And to 





 The example is not binding in the judicial process, when it is not considered suitable 
for the particular case. The necessary condition to use an example (or a «precedent» in legal 
terms) is the complete similarity of circumstances. Therefore, Guicciardini believes that it is 
not with examples that you can judge rightly, but only with rules. As we read in the last title 
of the Digest, De diversis regulis iuris antiqui, (on various rules from the ancient law), whose 
commentary was written by his mentor Filippo Decio and printed in a very successful book50 
(suggested in the updated version of the aforementioned guide for young students, as a good 
reading for the student of law during their holidays and summer breaks and as a way to keep 
their knowledge fresh), «a rule is that which briefly expounds a matter» (rem breviter 
enarrat). Legal rules are concise formulations drawn from the law: «the law is not derived 
from rules (regulae) but a rule is derived from the existing law»51. Therefore, the rule itself 
does not create law.  A rule is derived from the union of several cases which have the same 
«ratio». It is a «coniunctio rationum», i.e. it is derived from what happens more frequently, in 
other words, from what «normally» happens («quod plerumque accidit»; normally - norm). 
Its application to a particular case, however, requires «discretion». The Judge will have to see 
whether a particular rule may or may not be applied to the case in question, using discretion, 
above all, and passing from the universal rule to the particular case (according to Decio, for 
instance, «generaliter» means «universaliter», that what «normally» happens). This was the 
way of thinking which a jurist such as Guicciardini received formal training for. I believe that 
his Ricordi is an attempt to write a body of such designed rules. The way Guicciardini tries to 
decode them and give us a key to interpret properly his «ricordi», his «regole», it’s strictly 
related to his legal background, despite a well-alive tradition of aphoristic writings. He 
wasn’t simply writing a book of aphorisms. For a long time, historians tried to understand 
what these Ricordi really meant and the answer, given by Guicciardini himself, can be found 
in his ricordo A 11, which begins with these words: «These Ricordi are rules»52. Referring 
both to the Aristotelian and legal tradition, in the subsequent draft of the text (ricordo C 6) 
Guicciardini wrote53: 
 
It is great error to speak of the things of this world absolutely and indiscriminately and to deal with 
them, as it were, by the book. In nearly all things one must make distinctions and exceptions because 
of differences in their circumstances. These circumstances are not covered by one and the same rule. 
Nor can these distinctions and exceptions be found written in books. They must taught by discretion. 
 
 In this way, the unconditional use of examples, which according to his idea of legal 
training, Machiavelli wanted to apply to politics, is completely called into question by his 
friend Guicciardini. We understand why Machiavelli was, in Guicciardini’s eyes «ut 
plurimum extravagante di opinione delle comune et inventore di cose insolite e nuove», far 
from common opinion and inventor of unusual and new things, as we read in his letter dated 
May 18 152154. In this passage, Guicciardini uses a typical expression of the legal disputes. 
Referring to Bartolomeo Sozzini, the Sienese jurist which Poliziano called «Papinian of our 
century»55, his teacher Filippo Decio and Andrea Alciato said: «Moris sui est deviare a 
communi opinione, et regulis iuris»; he is used to deviating from common opinion and from 
the rules of law, hence creating something unusual in the law56. This is intended as a 
criticism, even if Guicciardini used these words both with irony and, I believe, admiration for 
his friend. His legal mind deprived him of that fantasy and courage that makes the thought of 
his friend so innovative: he, simply, couldn’t. From this point of view his work is very 
interesting because it shows the real tension and the profound crisis in the relationship 
between politics and law, law and conscience, politics and conscience.  
 Besides, the debate about the foundations of modern politics, so characteristic of the 
friendship between Machiavelli and Guicciardini, appears as a dispute on the different ways 




applying the examples taken from the histories to the present day. Guicciardini chooses to 
seek the rules, combining «esperienza» and «ragione» («ragionevolezza»), experience and 
good judgement; these rules have to be applied rightly, with the necessary discretion, in the 
same way as the judge has to apply the law, even though there’s a difference between the law 
and the way that States use in their relationships. Still talking about law, in his Ricordo C 
113, we read57: 
 
It is a mistake to think that the law subjects any matter to the arbitrary judgement – that is, to the free 
will – of the judge. For the law never gives the judge power to give or to take away. But those cases 
which the law cannot determine by a fixed rule must be left to the discretion of the judge. After 
considering all the circumstances and ramifications of the case, he must determine what he thinks is 
right, according to his synderesis and conscience. And in such cases, the judge needs answer to no 
man for his decisions; but he must answer to God, who knows whether he has decided justly. 
 
 So, in his Ricordo C 111, Guicciardini clarifies58: 
 
Common men [i.e. those who are not jurists] find the variety of opinions that exists among lawyers 
quite reprehensible, without realizing that it proceeds not from any defect in the men but from the 
nature of the subject. General rules cannot possibly comprehend all particular cases. Often, specific 
cases cannot be decided on the basis of law, but must rather be dealt with the opinions of men, which 
are not always in harmony. We see the same thing happen with doctors, philosophers, commercial 
arbitrators, and in the discourses of those who govern the state among whom there is no less variety of 
judgement than among lawyers. 
 
 Discretion, arbitrium, is necessary in the application of the rule to a particular case, 
and sometimes a case has to be judged according to the synderesis, i.e. to the conscience, 
leaving aside the rule of law. The «Guicciardinian moment» is still far from what we call 
«legal certainty». It is the judge’s conscience and the equity that locks the «system», which is 
not limited by the body of laws. In one of the most popular Legal Repertories of the 
Renaissance it is written: «Discretio et iudicium sunt idem»; «Discretion and judgement are 
the same»59. 
 Guicciardini, from his legal point of view, said that every example and every rule, to 
be applied to a particular case, even in ruling republics needs a «good and perspicacious 
eye». We can find these legal arguments even in the sermons of Girolamo Savonarola. His 
sermon of March 7 1498 was dedicated to the proper way to judge and apply a rule60. What 
he said was that among physicians and lawyers, some are able to discuss according to the 
rules and their books, but that they know neither how to rightly judge a case or how to cure a 
patient. Some others have «iudizio grande», a profound judgement, and thus know both how 
to judge and to cure. In short, these physicians come straight to the point, to the case at hand. 
The same applies to lawyers: they don’t have to be able to cite examples and references taken 
from the legal books, but they do have to know how to judge a particular case rightly. Being 
able only to discuss without judging means knowing nothing and the same applies to the 
rulers of the republics. Those who know how to judge say: this rule has to be applied here in 
this particular case, but not to this other one, and sometimes they leave aside the rule, to 
judge according to equity, conscience and discretion. They understand everything and see if a 
rule wasn’t made for a particular purpose. 
 Guicciardini uses these ideas to compose the Ricordi, a body of political rules, which 
he inserts even in his Dialogue on the Government of Florence and in his History of Italy. 
These would be interpreted in the same way even by the late Renaissance political thought as 
it is proven by a manuscript which contains a list of essential books «in matter of State», 




the best private libraries of the sixteenth century, consulted and appreciated by all the 
European scholars. The «Golden Rules» written by Guicciardini stands first and foremost, 
followed by the maxims of Lottini and Sansovino, written in imitation of Guicciardini’s 
work. Then we find the Considerations on the History of Italy, written by the Dominican 
Remigio Nannini, followed by Machiavelli and Gentillet’s Antimachiavel61.  
 So as we said earlier, the friendship between Machiavelli and Guicciardini grows in a 
period when the ties between law and politics face a deep crisis. We can certainly say that 
their dialogue is an important chapter of what Harold Berman, in his perspective of history, 
encouraged by his mentor Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, has called «the breakdown of the 
Western legal tradition»62. In our seminar I would like to talk about some topics related to 
this research that aims to become a book dedicated to the political thought of Guicciardini. 
First, I will try to explain, from a legal and political point of view what Guicciardini was 
doing, writing the controversial portraits of Lorenzo de’ Medici, depicted as tacit tyrant, in 
his Storie fiorentine and in his Storia d’Italia. Secondly, I will explain why a study about the 
impact of legal training on Guicciardini’s political thought is not only a matter that concerns 
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